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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects of ageing and child support in a model with en-
dogenous fertility and Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pensions. First, we show that
the endogeneity of fertility makes society vulnerable to both pessimistic beliefs
and changes in life expectancy. In particular, we show that the private fer-
tility choice may not coincide with the social optimum, due to the existence
of two external e¤ects of a child on society as a whole. The market outcome
without government intervention is e¢cient, however, as both externalities ex-
actly cancel out in that case. If the government wants to redistribute towards
the old, it cannot replicate the command optimum by merely applying lump-
sum transfers, but rather needs a child allowance scheme to e¤ectively alter
the number of o¤spring chosen by households. Finally, we analyse whether a
Pareto-improving social security reform is possible. It is shown that a mere
reduction of the PAYG-scheme cannot be Pareto-improving, but a combined
policy of decreasing the PAYG-tax and introducing child allowances can be.
JEL classi…cation: C61, D10, D84, H55, J13, J14, J18, J26
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overlapping generations, social security reform
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1 Introduction
As many societies will experience an ageing population in the near future, concerns
about the feasibility of current pension and health care arrangements are growing.
Indeed, the fact that most of these old-age facilities are …nanced on a Pay-As-You-
Go (PAYG)-basis may eventuate in serious problems when the share of the old in
total population is steadily rising. Figure 1 shows that this will be the case in the
upcoming decades for most OECD countries. Although extreme cases like Italy and
Japan are striking, also the United States will face a considerably aged population,
as its relative number of old by 2040 will be 50% higher than its present value.











Figure 1: Dependency Ratio Age 65+ (per 100).
Source: World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision.
The underlying causes of this demographic trend are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. As
can be seen from Figure 2, the number of children per woman has fallen dramatically
since the 1960s from around 2.5, and is expected to stay at a rather low level of 1.8.
Furthermore, people (will) live longer as Figure 3 shows. Due to improved medical
treatments and better nutrition, life span is expected to be about 7 years longer in
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the next …fty years. If the retirement age does not change, this amounts to 60% of
the average time that people nowadays spend in retirement.










Figure 2: Total Fertility Rate (per woman).
Source: World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision.
When analysing the economic consequences of such demographic shifts, most econo-
mists model population ageing as some exogenous shock by which the economy is
hit, thereby often assuming the (drop in the) rate of fertility to be exogenous.1 This,
however, completely passes over the fact that, at least in western countries, people
are to a very large extent able to freely choose the number of children they desire.
The fertility rate should therefore rather be treated as an endogenous variable, that
is, as the result of a rational choice that is in‡uenced by economic constraints and
incentives. As Razin and Sadka (1995) put it, once preferences are shaped by cul-
tural, ethnic, sociological and other factors, economics comes into play. Economic
1Malthus (1798) was the …rst economist who examined demography and dealt with fertility as
an endogenous variable. In his work, though, population growth would approach the biological limit
if it were not restricted by the moral restraints and misery that he described. These restrictions,
however, cannot explain the recent drop in fertility, as many of the involved economies experienced
substantial economic growth over the last decades.
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theory can thus help in explaining why the observed decline in the (desired) num-
ber of children would occur, and accordingly, many such explanations have been put
forward.2









Figure 3: Life Expectancy at Birth (in years).
Source: World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision.
According to the so-called new home economics, originated by Leibenstein (1957)
and Becker (1960), and which is the approach we will take in this paper, people
decide to have a certain number of children simply because they directly enter their
utility functions like any other consumption good. Consequently, standard consumer
demand theory can be applied to explain the evolution of family size. If o¤spring is
not a Gi¤en good, then in line with this, better labour force opportunities of women
2Obviously, as Becker (1991) pointed out, the increased availability of contraceptives seems an
important explanation of the drop in fertility. Yet one could argue that this availability is merely an
induced response to the underlying decrease of the demand for children. It thus does not explain why
people actually have these preferences. Furthermore, di¤erent birth control methods already existed
before the pill was invented. Besides, “The decline [of fertility] began in the 1950s in countries like
the United States and Japan, although the pill is illegal in Japan and was not extensively used in
the United States until the 1960s” (Becker, 1991, p. 144).
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and higher (real) wage rates increase the opportunity costs of rearing a child, and
can therefore account for the decline in fertility.3 Another explanation may be found
in the fact that the number and availability of alternative pleasant commodities and
activities has increased. A second motive for rearing children is provided by the
old-age security hypothesis, as described by e.g. Bental (1989) and Cigno (1992),
which states that people choose children because o¤spring has the characteristics
of a capital good, in that it will provide services to the retired parents. Children
thus indirectly enhance utility by serving as insurance against the risk of old-age
dependency. They have experienced increasing competition in this respect too, viz.
from …nancial assets since capital markets have become more developed and accessible
to many in society.4 Moreover, modern societies are typically characterized by public
insurance against the risk of old-age dependency through public pension schemes and
collective health care arrangements. These are nearly all …nanced on a PAYG-basis,
which inevitably implies that part of the bene…ts of a child mainly reveal itself in a
growing tax base and therefore fall to society as a whole. Those bene…ts thus become
imperceptible to the individual (atomistic) parent. Put di¤erently, children nowadays
involve positive social externalities. Accordingly, Folbre (1994) typi…es o¤spring as
a public (rather than a private) capital good. Because of this, individuals do not
consider their progeny as ‘investment goods’ any more, although they still are for the
entire society. So the old-age security hypothesis no longer explains the individual
‘demand for children’. On the contrary, people can instead free ride on the public
system and neglect the positive social externalities that emanate from their o¤spring
by having just a few children (or none at all) and still being entitled to complete old-
age insurance. Considering the fact that raising a child implies high (and, according to
many, increasing) parental expenditures for a substantial part of the parents’ life, this
free-riding behaviour seems quite a plausible explanation for the drop in population
growth.
Altogether, family size is typically a decision that impacts the household for a
fairly long time. When deciding on the number of children, agents therefore have
to form expectations about the …nancial position during (the rest of) their lives, for
that is nearly always uncertain. An important determinant of these expectations is
the generosity of the social security system once people are retired. A society with
relatively few young citizens, for instance, will be more likely to have low pension
bene…ts. This is indeed what people nowadays fear to occur, urging them to save a
lot. Moreover, a PAYG-scheme inherently implies dependency on other generations,
whose solidarity is not guaranteed beforehand. Sjoblom (1985) and Kotliko¤ et al.
3Becker and Lewis (1974) stated that not children per se, but rather their services enter the
parents’ utility function. These do not only depend on the number of children, but also on their
quality. Substitution of quality for quantity (due to a change in the parents’ preferences or an
increasing price of quality) may then be another explanation for the drop in fertility.
4On the other hand, this implies better opportunities to smooth income over life, thus increasing
welfare and consequently causing a (positive) income e¤ect on the number of children, which may
dominate the negative substitution e¤ect. See e.g. Cigno (1992) and Razin and Sadka (1995).
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(1988) demonstrate that a public pension system re‡ects a social contract between
old and young generations that can be passed on to successive young generations.
Although every generation has an incentive to perform the contract, it is not sure
to what extent future generations are willing to contribute to old-age support. As
a consequence, the perceived extent to which old-age consumption possibilities are
limited plays an important role in the savings decision. Growing pessimism towards
the future will induce people to cut back on their expenditures when young, including
those for o¤spring if fertility is endogenous and the old-age security hypothesis plays
no role in fertility choice. These bad feelings may be rational or totally irrational,
based on rumours or generally felt sentiments. Anyway, a declining number of children
diminishes the internal rate of a return of the PAYG-scheme, which indeed implies
less scope for bounteous old-age support. So the fear of meagre old-age can turn out
to be a self-ful…lling prophecy, leading to a ‘collapse’ of the PAYG-pension system
and higher savings, i.e., a (partial) transition to a funded system. The greater the
extent to which progeny has the features of a luxurious good, the more amenable
society will be to such sentiments. Furthermore, an increase in the expected life span
will in‡uence the rate of population growth when fertility is endogenous. If people
want to save more because of their increasing longevity, they would do that partly
by having fewer children if o¤spring is only considered as a consumption good and
the social externalities are neglected. But this only aggravates the ageing problem
since one type of ageing leads to another type of ageing and the dependency ratio
rises even further.
This paper will assess the sensitivity of social security arrangements in a soci-
ety where fertility is endogenous, and look at the role the government can play in
improving welfare. It is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
We will consider a small open economy where non-altruistic individuals derive utility
from material consumption and the number of their children. At the beginning of
their lives, they decide on the allocation of their lifetime income. When old, the
government provides a pension bene…t that is …nanced on a PAYG-basis.
Section 3 shows that the endogeneity of fertility makes society vulnerable to both
pessimistic beliefs and increasing longevity. Throughout the paper, individuals are
assumed to have perfect foresight. Subsection 3.1 is an exception in this respect be-
cause there we will assume that individuals are not able to perfectly foresee the future
bene…t levels and that they consequently form adaptive expectations. Furthermore,
at a certain point in time, some generation is assumed to attach a positive probability
to a scenario in which a setback in social security occurs, re‡ecting pessimistic beliefs.
This turns out to have a negative impact on both consumption and the number of
children, thus narrowing the future tax base. As a result, the actual pension bene…t
decreases, making the pessimistic beliefs seemingly come true. In Subsection 3.2 we
turn back to perfect foresight and analyse the e¤ects of increasing lifetime. It again
appears that individuals desire to save more and thus cut …rst-period spending, in-
cluding those on o¤spring, because they do not take the positive externalities of their
5
children into account. Contrary to the pessimistic beliefs analyzed in Subsection 3.1,
increasing longevity is persistent, and so are its long-run consequences.
Because o¤spring has the features of a public good, all this raises the question
whether the individual fertility choice is also optimal from a societal point of view.
Section 4 therefore describes the command optimum. We …nd that there are two
opposite externalities involved. First, an extra child implies a higher future output,
and second, an extra child reduces the capital-labour ratio (or per capita debt in a
small open economy). Parents who do not take these externalities into account are
thus likely to give birth to a suboptimal number of children. We show, however,
that the market solution without government intervention is Pareto-e¢cient as both
externalities exactly cancel out. But if the government wants to redistribute between
generations, the command optimum cannot be replicated by merely applying lump-
sum transfers, but rather needs an additional instrument that induces substitution
e¤ects so as to e¤ectively alter the number of children chosen by households. In
particular, if the government redistributes from the young to the old, children on
balance involve a positive externality and a system of child allowances in addition
to the PAYG-transfers makes the achievement of the …rst-best outcome possible. If,
however, the resources are transferred in the opposite direction, i.e., from the old
to the young, then the net external e¤ect of o¤spring is negative and a tax per
child is necessary to achieve Pareto-e¢ciency. A similar conclusion is also drawn by
Harford (1998), where children entail a (negative) pollution externality created by
their consumption of particular commodities in the future.
Section 5 analyses whether social security reforms can be implemented in a Pareto-
improving way, i.e., without utility loss for any generation, if one starts from a situa-
tion in which there only exists a PAYG-pension scheme. We …rst discuss the e¤ects of
introducing a system of child allowances that internalizes the positive net externality
that o¤spring generates in this setting. We show that introducing such a system is a
Pareto-improvement if the subsidy per child is not too high. Next, we elaborate on
the e¤ect of reducing the size of the PAYG-scheme. This is a social security reform
that is discussed in many western countries in reaction to the ageing of the popula-
tion they experience, based on the notion that a lower PAYG-tax would be optimal
in the long run when the economy is characterized by dynamic e¢ciency. It is well
known, however, that such a decrease in the size of PAYG-scheme is not Pareto-
improving when fertility is exogenous (see Verbon, 1988, and Breyer, 1989), unless
there is some externality involved. If abolishing the PAYG-scheme goes along with
the elimination of a negative external e¤ect, as for example in Homburg (1990), then
a Pareto-improving transition to a funded system is possible. Likewise, such a tran-
sition can be achieved if the increase of savings that results when the PAYG-scheme
is reduced has positive external e¤ects (see Belan and Pestieau, 1998). One might
therefore conjecture that downsizing the PAYG-scheme yields a Pareto-improvement
when fertility is endogenous, since it decreases the external e¤ect of the pension sys-
tem on the number of o¤spring, thus realizing a positive welfare e¤ect that enables the
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Pareto-improving transition to funded pensions that is not possible if fertility were
exogenous. Yet, we prove that just like in the models of Verbon (1988) and Breyer
(1989) with exogenous fertility, merely reducing the PAYG-tax does not allow for a
Pareto-improvement. We also show, however, that downsizing the PAYG-scheme can
bring about a Pareto-improvement if it is combined with the introduction of a child
allowance scheme. The reason for this is that a higher number of children not only
increases PAYG-pension bene…ts for a given social security tax, but also implies a
direct utility gain. The sum of these gains, that fall to all future generations, can
outweigh the utility loss su¤ered by the initial retired for the decrease in their pension
bene…t. Hence, by appropriate intergenerational redistribution (i.e., after completely
compensating these retirees), no generation is worse o¤ and at least one gains from
the transition policy.
Section 6 winds up with some concluding remarks.
2 The Economy
In this section we present a two-period overlapping generations model of a small
open economy that will be applied throughout the paper. We …rst brie‡y describe
the production side of the economy, then we introduce the households. Furthermore,
we describe the social security system superimposed on the economy. The section
concludes with the …rst-order conditions that follow from optimizing household be-
haviour.
Production
Consider a small open economy that consists of a large number of identical agents,
who only di¤er in age. Production is described by a standard neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale production function,
yt = f(kt); (1)
where kt and yt stand for the amount of capital and the output per young individ-
ual in period t, respectively. Perfect competition among producers gives the usual
equilibrium conditions on the production factor markets, rt =
d f(kt)
d kt
´ f 0(kt) and
wt = f(kt) ¡ f 0(kt)kt, where rt is the interest rate and wt denotes the corresponding
wage rate in period t. Under the assumption of a small open economy, the inter-
est rate is exogenously determined at the world capital markets (rt = r; 8t) and
consequently both the capital-labour ratio and the wage rate are constant5
k = f 0¡1(r); (2.a)
w = f(k) ¡ f 0(k)k: (2.b)
5The assumption of a small open economy is made for analytical convenience and does not
qualitatively a¤ect the results in the paper.
7
Households
The economy is populated by non-altruistic individuals who live for two periods, such
that in each period, both a young and an old generation are alive. Apart from age,
individuals are identical. Every young individual faces a probability of " to grow old,
so 1¡ " is the fraction of young that dies after one period of life. When young, the
agent inelastically supplies one unit of labour. Part of her gross wage income is taxed
away by the government via an exogenous lump-sum tax (¿); the remainder is either
spent on consumption (both material consumption (cy) and o¤spring6 (n)) or is saved
for old age (s). That is, we assume children to be viewed as normal goods, which
can be ‘bought’ at an exogenous price p. This price re‡ects the cost of raising a child
in terms of material consumption goods.7 Consequently, at any time t, …rst-period
consumption is restricted by the following budget constraint,
cyt + pnt = w ¡ ¿ ¡ st: (3)
In the second period of her life, the individual is retired and entitled to a public
pension bene…t. She derives utility from old-age (material) consumption (co)8, which
is …nanced from the return on …rst-period savings and the pension bene…t (´). Savings
are invested in annuities or through an actuarially fair pension fund. As only a
fraction "t+1 of young savers born at time t survives to period t + 1, the assets of
those who deceased fall to the surviving contemporaries. The total return on the
loans is therefore 1+r
"t+1




st + ´t+1: (4)
As for the social security scheme, a young individual does not know the level of the
future public pension bene…t when deciding how much to save. She therefore has to
form expectations on the future generosity of the scheme. Throughout the paper we
assume agents to form rational expectations. As we abstract from factual uncertainty,
this boils down to perfect foresight. Subsection 3.1 is an exception in this respect.
There we will assume that expectations are non-rational, at least in the short-run,
and liable to (irrational) rumours.
Young people derive utility from their children (nt) and material consumption
(cyt ), whereas the retired value material consumption (c
o
t+1) only, as mentioned above.
6For simplicity we neglect gender di¤erences as well as the di¤erence between an individual and
a household. Furthermore, we assume that every individual is able to freely choose a number of
children from the set of nonnegative real numbers. The quality of children is constant and equal for
all children.
7See e.g. Van Praag and Warnaar (1997) for a survey on the measurement of the cost of children.
These costs include food, clothing, housing, child care and education. Longman (1998) estimated
that these costs can amount to $200,000 (corrected for in‡ation and not taking the foregone wage
income into account). For another estimation of the cost of children, see e.g. Bourguignon (1999).
8If she derived utility from children too, the main results still hold.
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If we assume utility to be additively separable over time, the expected lifetime utility
of a representative agent born at any time t is given by
EtU (c
y




t ; nt) + ¯"t+1Etv(c
o
t+1); (5)
where ¯ is the private discount rate, u and v stand for the strictly concave and twice
continuously di¤erentiable felicity functions when young and old, respectively, and
Et denotes the mathematical expectation over v(cot+1) conditional on the information
set at time t. Notice that individuals are assumed to be non-altruistic: they do not
care about the welfare of others, and in particular, the quality of their o¤spring’s life
is not an argument in their utility function.
The social security system
The government runs the social security system as a PAYG-scheme with, at any time
t, the following (balanced) budget constraint,
"t´t = nt¡1¿; (6)
where nt¡1 is the number of children per individual at time t¡ 1, which is by de…n-
ition the population growth rate (i.e., Nt = nt¡1Nt¡1, with Nt the number of young
individuals at time t). However, individual agents act atomistically and do not take
this budget constraint into account when deciding on the number of children. So
we abstract from the possibility that an individual household considers o¤spring as
an ‘investment good’ that yields a return in the form of a transfer when old. This
‘old-age security hypothesis’ played an important role in traditional economies (and
still does in many developing countries) where the transfers from the young to the
old took place within the family (see e.g. Cigno, 1992). However, in modern west-
ern economies, intergenerational transfers for old age are institutionalized in public
pension systems. This socializes the investment aspect of children and introduces
the possibility for an individual household to free ride on the system by rearing few
children (or none at all) and still being entitled to a full pension bene…t (see e.g.
Folbre, 1994). Consequently, the decision on the family size is completely determined
by the utility that parents directly derive from their o¤spring. To assure a determi-
nate steady state, we assume that p > ¿
1+r
, that is, the costs of raising children are
larger than the (implicit social) return on a child, which equals the present value of
its contribution to the PAYG-scheme.9
Individuals maximize expected lifetime utility (5) subject to their single-period bud-
get constraints (3) and (4). Given the properties of the felicity functions, the optimal
9If this were not the case, the number of children would grow in…nitely large and the steady state
of the model would be indeterminate.
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levels of material consumption (cy¤t ) and o¤spring (n
¤
t ) are uniquely determined by

















where uc ´ @u(¢)@cy , un ´
@u(¢)
@n
, vc ´ @v(¢)@co , and co¤t+1 = 1+r"t+1s
¤
t + ´t+1 with s
¤
t = w ¡ ¿ ¡
cy¤t ¡ pn¤t .
Equation (7.a) is the standard condition that households equate the marginal rate
of substitution between current and future consumption to the rate of interest. Ac-
cording to equation (7.b), households choose the number of children and consumption
in their …rst period of life such that the marginal rate of substitution between a child
and current consumption equals the marginal cost of rearing an extra child.
3 Endogenous Fertility and Societal Vulnerability
In this section we show that in the presence of a PAYG-social security scheme the
endogeneity of fertility makes society vulnerable to certain shocks. Subsection 3.1
analyzes the economic consequences of pessimistic beliefs. In Subsection 3.2 we in-
vestigate the e¤ects of a higher life expectancy. In both cases it appears that the
individuals’ decisions do not coincide with those that would maximize social welfare.
3.1 Rumours
In this subsection we analyse the e¤ects of a change in the agents’ beliefs. In par-
ticular, we investigate the e¤ects of a stronger belief that the PAYG-scheme will less
generous than it currently is. To capture these beliefs, we assume some sort of adap-
tive expectations, that is, individuals estimate the bene…t level to be equal to its
actual current level with probability (1 ¡ »t), and they attach a probability of »t to
a scenario in which their future pension bene…ts will be ¢ below the current level.10
The level of the public pension bene…t perceived by an individual born at time t can
thus be described as
Et´t+1 =
½
´t ¡¢ with probability »t
´t with probability (1¡ »t) ; (8)
A positive value of »t could be due to factual uncertainty with respect to the level
of the future pension bene…t. It could, for instance, re‡ect uncertainty with respect
10This way of modeling beliefs is similar to Galor and Stark (1990), who analyse the impact of the
probability of return migration on migrants’ savings. Another way to model adaptive expectations
would be to assume that the expected bene…t level at time t + 1 equals the actual level (´t) minus
some term re‡ecting the forecast error made one period earlier (´t ¡ Et¡1´t). This does not change
the results.
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to the degree of solidarity displayed by future young generations. As a matter of
fact, PAYG-pension schemes can be regarded as implicit social contracts (see e.g.
Sjoblom, 1985, and Kotliko¤ et al., 1988). Such contracts may be renounced by
future generations with a positive probability. In this case, there will always be a
di¤erence between the ex ante rational expectation of the pension bene…t and its ex
post realization. In the same vein, one could think of »t as the objective probability
that ageing will occur because ageing implies that the internal rate of return of the
PAYG-scheme declines. In the sequel we abstract from factual uncertainty, however,
and we start from an equilibrium in which all exogenous factors are constant and
»t = 0; 8t. In that case, the adaptive expectations boil down to perfect foresight, i.e.,
Et´t+1 = ´t, 8t.
Starting from this perfect-foresight equilibrium, we analyse the e¤ects of a tem-
porary increase in »t:11 So we assume that expectations become irrational for a while.
The reason for this may be that people su¤er from what Pigou (1920) called a ‘faulty
telescopic faculty’ and misjudge the future bene…t level.12 They may also base their
expectations on rumours, that is, attach a positive subjective probability to a sce-
nario that would occur with zero probability. For example, the subjective probability
that ageing saps the social security bene…ts may be positive, even though there is no
objective reason to anticipate this.
The analysis of this change in expectations will be based on a linearized version
of the small open economy presented in the previous section. Let
»t = ¸ht; 8t; (9)
where ht describes the time pattern of a perturbation of the steady state of » - which
is equal to zero - and ¸ measures the magnitude of this perturbation. The e¤ects
of a marginal change in the beliefs can then be traced by di¤erentiation of the …rst-
order conditions (7.a) and (7.b) with respect to ¸. Without loss of generality in
the remainder of this subsection, we consider the following particular shock to the
beliefs: pessimism occurs at time t = 0 and lasts for only one period, i.e., h0 > 0;
h1 = h2 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = 0: We …nd the following relation between a marginal change in the






+ Ãht; t = 0; 1; : : : ; (10)
with 0 < Á < 1 and Ã < 0. For a description of the coe¢cients of the …rst-order
di¤erence equation (10) it is referred to Appendix A.
11We only allow for temporary shocks to avoid the problems which might occur if beliefs turn out
to be inconsistent in the long run
12Feldstein (1985) also referred to this lack of perfect foresight when analysing the optimal level
of pension bene…ts in a society consisting of both ‘life-cyclers’ and ‘myopes’. In this respect, » could
be interpreted as the fraction of population that has pessimistic feelings about the future level of
social security bene…ts.
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. The pessimistic expectation of a less generous pension scheme












so spreading rumours acts as a stimulus for funded social security. Moreover, the
rumour that ageing saps the return on premiums for PAYG-pension schemes appears
to be self-ful…lling in the short run, i.e., at any given level of the social security tax









The pension bene…t that the …rst generation actually receives (´1) may indeed equal
their expectation (´¡1 ¡ »¢).13 Figure 4 visualizes the evolution of the change of the







Figure 4: The Evolution of the Change in Family Size.
As di¤erence equation (10) is stable (0 < Á < 1), the initial decline in the number
of o¤spring will be followed by a continuous increase and the economy will gradually
13This is the case if ¿dn0 = ¡¸h0¢, i.e., if ¿Ã = ¡¢ when ¸ = 1.
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.14 This increase is due to the fact that
during this transition period the expected bene…ts always lag behind their realiza-
tions, so any subsequent generation will adapt its expectations with respect to the
bene…t level upwards. Even if the expectation of the …rst generation indeed comes
true, and is thereby equal to the bene…t that their children expect to receive, fam-
ily size nevertheless rises. This is so because the …rst generation takes two di¤erent
future scenarios into account when deciding on their family size, whereas subsequent
generations only anticipate one future state (albeit adaptively). They thus face no
uncertainty. Because individuals are assumed to be risk averse, this means that the
generation without uncertainty decides to have more children than the initial genera-
tion if their expected bene…ts equal. As this implies an increasing PAYG-bene…t, the
expected bene…t also increases and the number of children gradually rises. Bad be-
liefs thus only cause temporary e¤ects; in the long run, expectations have to coincide
with realizations. This means rational expectations, bringing us back to the original
steady state.
The following proposition summarizes the analysis above.
Proposition 1 If the members of one generation perceive their future pension ben-
e…ts to be less generous, the level of savings initially increases and the number of
children declines. Consequently, rumours appear to be a self-ful…lling prophecy to the
members of this generation. However, the economy recovers its original equilibrium,
so there are no long run e¤ects and pessimism is not persistent.
Adaptive expectations and the endogeneity of fertility thus have important conse-
quences for the dynamics of the economy.
Endogenous versus exogenous population growth
Comparing the previous results to those in case fertility were exogenous, it can be
seen that …rst-period material consumption decreases to a lesser degree if fertility is
endogenous, because in that case people will also economise on children when expected
lifetime income declines.15 Furthermore, the increase in savings with an exogenous















This is due to the fact that the costs of rearing children are only incurred in the
…rst period of one’s life, so pessimistic feelings about the future decrease …rst-period
14Whenever time subscripts are omitted we refer to the initial steady state value of the respective
variable.
15Notice that it only makes sense to compare the e¤ects of a rumour if the initial (steady) states
are the same. The assumptions to guarantee this are given in Appendix A.
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expenditures to a greater extent when fertility is endogenous. Moreover, an exoge-
nous fertility rate implies that the level of the PAYG-pensions does not change, and
accordingly, neither do expectations about the future levels. As, due to the small-
open-economy assumption, factor prices are …xed too, the economy would therefore
immediately converge to the old steady state (i.e., in our setup within one period),
so savings are also higher in case of endogenous fertility compared to exogenous pop-
ulation growth in subsequent periods; they would only equal in the long run.
The next subsection looks at a higher life expectancy, a demographic change that
is permanent both in its occurrence and, as it appears, in its economic consequences.
3.2 Increasing longevity
The ageing of the population that is expected in the next decades for most indus-
trialized countries is not only brought about by a decrease in the fertility rate, but
also by an increasing life span. Because people are expected to live longer and the
retirement age does not rise (or even decreases), a higher fraction of lifetime consump-
tion will have to be backed by pension income, such as savings and bene…ts. This
demographic change is likely to be permanent, so unless the retirement age rises, its
consequences are permanent as well. This subsection explores the relation between
increasing longevity, the number of children and the size of the PAYG-pension scheme
in the small-open economy described in Section 2.
Again assuming that the only reason for people to give birth to children is the
fact that they directly enter their …rst-period utility function, the consumption levels
and number of children that they choose are uniquely determined by the …rst-order
conditions (7.a) and (7.b). Taking the individual budget constraints into account,







< 0, as verbalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the (expected) life span increases, savings increase and the number
of children declines. This causes the dependency ratio to rise even further. Con-
sequently, the PAYG-pension scheme deteriorates both in the short and in the long
run.
As people live longer and the retirement age does not change, old-age consumption
will get a higher weight in the decision on the intertemporal allocation of lifetime
income. Although the return on annuities decreases if " gets higher, the expected
interest rate does not change. So increasing longevity merely acts like a decline in
the rate of time preference. People do not consider the fact that their child increases
next period’s output because these gains not only fall to them, but to society as a
whole. They thus fail to recognize the positive impact of a child on second period
utility. If they did so, a higher life expectancy might have a positive impact on family
size. This, however, is not the case. On the contrary, a longer life span causes both
consumption when young and o¤spring to decrease instantaneously to the new steady
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state values.16 This implies a lower PAYG-bene…t, which intensi…es the increase in
savings. Increasing longevity therefore implies that a larger part of old-age income is
…nanced through a funded scheme.
The problem of ageing is thus exacerbated by individual fertility decisions and
public pension arrangements. In contrast to the e¤ects of rumours, that turned
out to be temporary, increasing longevity has lasting consequences for the economy.
Agents apparently take decisions that are not optimal for society as a whole, thus
eventually putting themselves at a disadvantage. The next sections therefore explore
the socially optimal number of children and what the appropriate government action
might be.
4 The First-Best Solution
In this section we …rst derive the command optimum, i.e., the level of savings and
the family size that would be chosen by a social-welfare maximizing dictator. Subse-
quently, we compare the social optimum with the private optimum that was derived
above and analyse what instruments a government needs in order to be able to repli-
cate this command optimum in a market setting.
Consider a social planner whose objective function consists of the lifetime utilities





where ® < 1 is the social discount factor, i.e., the factor at which the planner dis-
counts lifetime utility of future generations. Notice that we assume the weight of
a generation’s utility in the social welfare function to be independent of the size of
this generation. In other words, we apply a Millian rather than a Benthamite social
welfare function. The reason for this is that there is no well-de…ned optimum for a
Benthamite social welfare function when fertility is endogenous as this implies that
the weights in the welfare function are a choice variable. For analytical convenience,
we assume the utility function of a representative individual to be additively separable
and the felicity functions to be logarithmic, Ui = log(c
y
i ) + ° log(ni)+ ¯"i+1 log(c
o
i+1).
The social planner is each period restricted by the small open economy’s resource
16Due to the small-open-economy assumption factor prices are …xed and the economy converges
to its new steady state within one period.
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constraint, which can be expressed in per capita terms as17
f(kt) + kt + ntdt+1 = c
y
t + pnt +
"tcot
nt¡1
+ ntkt+1 + (1 + r)dt; (15)
with dt denoting the per capita foreign debt of the country.18 Because of perfect
capital mobility, the capital-labour ratio is constant at k = f 0¡1(r).
Maximizing (14) at time t subject to the resource constraint (15) results in the













p+ k ¡ d¤¤t+1
° + ¯"t+1
; (16.c)
where x¤¤ denotes the socially optimal value of variable x. Conditions (16.a) and
(16.b) describe the optimal inter- and intragenerational allocation, respectively. No-
tice that, in the steady state, condition (16.a) boils down to n¤¤ = ®(1 + r). This
means that the socially optimal number of children is uniquely determined by the
social discount factor and the exogenous world interest rate. Furthermore, condition
(16.b) is equivalent to equation (7.a), implying that the dictator respects the individ-
ual’s savings decision. Condition (16.c) gives the optimal relationship between the
number of children and young-age consumption. This equation di¤ers from the one
the private sector uses to choose family size. The equivalent of equation (7.b) for the







Comparing (16.c) with (7.b’) indicates the two reasons why the choice of individual
households deviates from the social optimum:
² the dependency-ratio e¤ect, as captured by the ¯"-term in (16.c) which the
private sector does not take into account: a higher number of children implies
that in the future, total output increases, which is shared with the same number
of pensioners, so the PAYG-bene…ts could increase; private agents e¤ectively
discount future consumption at the rate ¯";
17This equation can be read as follows. If xt denotes (per capita) net exports, the (per capita)
current account can be written as xt¡rdt and the (per capita) capital account is given by ntdt+1¡dt.
Equilibrium of the balance of payments requires these two to sum up to zero, implying ntdt+1 =
(1 + r)dt ¡ xt. Notice that in case of a closed economy xt = dt ´ 0 and kt replaces dt as one of the
social planner’s instruments.
18We assume that the small open economy can borrow any amount at the world interest rate.
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² the capital-dilution e¤ect : the private sector does not take the term k ¡ d in
equation (16.c) into account (which equals savings at time t). In a small open
economy, the capital-labour ratio is given at k. Part of the capital stock is
…nanced by national savings (s), the remainder by foreigners (d). If the number
of children increases, a higher capital stock is needed in order to keep per capita
production at its former level. This means that savings should be higher, unless
the total capital stock is …nanced with foreign debt (i.e., k = d). However,
individual non-altruistic households do not take into account that an extra
child should induce them to save more. In fact, the true price of an extra child
is not just p, but also the extra capital stock that the child needs to be endowed
with in order to be as productive (in the future) as the other children. From
this point of view, people decide to have too many children, because they do
not realize that an extra child implies - ceteris paribus - a lower capital-labour
ratio, so less production per capita.
So the number of children in a market economy may be too low or too high as com-
pared to the command optimum, depending on whether the dependency-ratio e¤ect
dominates or is dominated by the capital-dilution e¤ect. Finally, we can conclude
that fertility is optimal if the dependency-ratio e¤ect happens to exactly o¤set the
capital-dilution e¤ect.
It is well known that in case of exogenous fertility, the government is able to repli-
cate the …rst-best solution in a market setting provided it has a system of lump-sum
intergenerational transfers at its disposal (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Chap-
ter 3). The analysis above shows, however, that in general, the government needs
an additional instrument in order to be able to do so when the number of o¤spring
is also a choice variable. If the dependency-ratio e¤ect exceeds the capital-dilution
e¤ect, the government is in want of an additional instrument in order to stimulate
households to have a larger number of o¤spring (in the opposite case it would need an
instrument to decrease population growth). Obviously, this could be accomplished by
lump-sum …nanced child allowance (or a lump-sum rebated tax on children). Since
o¤spring can be considered a normal good, a decrease (increase) of its price due to a
subsidy (tax) per child would induce people to have more (fewer) children. Empirical
evidence suggests that child allowances indeed have a signi…cant (though moderate)
positive e¤ect on fertility choice (see e.g. Blanchet and Ekert-Ja¤é, 1994). In Ap-
pendix C we show that the government can realize the …rst-best solution in a market
economy if it is able to use a combination of lump-sum …nanced child allowances and
PAYG-transfers. In particular, the following proposition is proven.
Proposition 3 The government is able to replicate the command optimum in a mar-
ket if it has lump-sum intergenerational transfers and an instrument that a¤ects the
price of children at its disposal. In particular, the government can realize the …rst-best
outcome in a market














The …rst part of Proposition 3 de…nes the government discount factor for which the
market solution coincides with the command optimum. So for this social discount
factor, the government does not redistribute between generations. Moreover, the
dependency-ratio e¤ect and the capital-dilution e¤ect exactly cancel out, implying
that the government does not need an instrument to a¤ect the number of o¤spring.
This means that the market solution without government intervention is Pareto-
e¢cient. The remainder of the proposition describes a result that is remarkable
for two reasons. First, it states that (starting from ® = n
¤
1+r
) an increase in ®,
implying that the government attaches a relatively lower weight to the utility of
the current old as compared to that of the current young, leads to the introduction
of PAYG-pensions. Second, it follows from Proposition 3 that the optimal level
of child allowances is positive if and only if it is optimal to have a PAYG-pension
system. So it appears that the net external e¤ect of children is positive, that is, the
number of o¤spring without child allowances is too low, i¤ there is a PAYG-pension
system. The reason for this is of course that the existence of a PAYG-pension system
implies that part of the social bene…ts of having a child reveal itself in a growing
tax base and are imperceptible to the individual parent. If, on the other hand, the
government redistributes from the older to younger generations, the capital-dilution
e¤ect dominates the dependency-ratio e¤ect, so that it is optimal to introduce a tax
on o¤spring.
5 Child Allowances as a Pareto-Improving Device
to Reform Social Security
Naturally, the …rst-best solution derived in the previous section is Pareto-e¢cient.
This does not imply, however, that introducing the optimal instruments in a mar-
ket economy (where these instruments previously did not exist) leads to a Pareto-
improvement. In particular, it is well-known that if the economy is dynamically
e¢cient, the introduction of intergenerational redistribution through a lump-sum …-
nanced PAYG-scheme harms future generations as in that case savings yield a higher
return than the PAYG-scheme (1 + r > n). Yet, many western countries have exten-
sive intergenerational redistribution schemes of this type. The reason for this may be
that they were introduced in times of dynamic ine¢ciency or that they were decided
upon through a political process that did not take account of the adverse welfare
e¤ects on future generations (see e.g. Browning, 1975). In this section we study the
possibilities of Pareto-improving social security reforms if one starts from a situa-
tion in which there exists a PAYG-pension scheme (¿ > 0) but no child allowance.
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We …rst discuss the e¤ects of introducing a child allowance scheme that internalizes
the positive net externality that o¤spring generates in this setting. We show that
introducing (or extending) a child allowance scheme is a Pareto-improvement if the
subsidy per child is not too high. Next, we elaborate on the e¤ect of reducing the
size of the existing PAYG-scheme. This kind of social-security reform is considered in
many countries, arguing that in view of the population ageing that decreases the im-
plicit rate of return of PAYG-schemes, a transition from unfunded to funded pension
schemes is desired. But once it is installed, a PAYG-scheme cannot be abandoned
without harming at least one generation. Without additional policy, the current and
future young gain from a transition to a funded system that yields a higher rate of
return, whereas current elderly and retired su¤er a loss. It is often thought that such
a transition can be turned into a Pareto-improvement using an adequate debt policy.
The idea is that the loss su¤ered by the current elderly can be compensated through
an increase in public debt which can subsequently be redeemed using part of the gains
of future generations. However, Verbon (1988) and Breyer (1989) have shown that
this is not possible when fertility is exogenous: the gains of all future generations are
exactly equal to what is needed for the compensation of the current elderly, so no
generation can gain from the transition.19 In this section we also analyse the possibil-
ity of a Pareto-improving transition from unfunded to funded pensions when fertility
is endogenous. We generalize the Verbon-Breyer result to this case, i.e., we show that
- abstaining from distortionary taxes and endogenous growth - a policy that merely
reduces the PAYG-tax cannot bring about a Pareto-improvement. Subsequently, we
study whether it is possible to have a Pareto-improving transition when it is combined
with the introduction of a child-support system. We show that in a dynamically e¢-
cient economy a policy of abandoning the PAYG-pension scheme in combination with
the introduction of a child allowance scheme may indeed be a Pareto-improvement.
5.1 Introducing child allowances
Suppose that at some time t = 0 a child allowance (') is introduced in an economy
with a PAYG-pension …nanced by a lump-sum tax ¿ > 0: Because we assume that
the child allowance scheme is …nanced by a lump-sum tax µ on the young generation,
the welfare of the old generation at time t = 0 is not a¤ected. Moreover, the e¤ect
on the utility of the current young and all future generations is identical. It therefore
su¢ces to check whether the current young gain in order to assess if the introduction
19This conclusion hinges on the assumptions with respect to the form of the production function
and the absence of tax distortions. Homburg (1990), for instance, demonstrated that if the PAYG-
tax distorts the labour-leisure choice of individuals, and private contributions to a funded scheme
do not, a transition can bring about a Pareto-improvement. Furthermore, Belan et al. (1998) and
Corneo and Marquardt (2000) described such a transition policy in an endogenous growth model.
Because the aggregate capital stock then exerts a positive externality on the productivity of workers,
a higher savings rate due to a shift to a more funded scheme causes e¢ciency gains that can be high
enough for the transition policy to be Pareto-improving.
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of a child allowance scheme is Pareto-improving.
Using equations (C.2) and (C.4) and the fact that µt = nt', we can write the
young’s life-time utility as:
U0 = log
Ã·
(p¡ ')(1 + r)(w ¡ ¿ )








When we compare lifetime utility in the initial situation without a child allowance
(' = 0) with that in case there is a child allowance scheme (' > 0), we see that






[p(1+r)(1+¯+°)¡'(1+¯)(1+r)¡°¿ ] < p(1+r)(1+¯+°)¡°¿: (18)
Notice that both sides of (18) are equal for ' = 0. Furthermore, it can easily be
checked that the derivative of the left-hand side of (18) with respect to ' in the
initial situation (' = 0) is negative if the PAYG-tax is positive (¿ > 0): Finally, it
is evident that the left-hand side of (18) exceeds its right-hand side if ' tends to p:
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Introducing a child allowance in an economy with a PAYG-pension
scheme is Pareto-improving provided the subsidy on children is not too high compared
to the costs of raising a child.
The intuition behind this result is that a higher number of children implies utility
gains through two channels. First, children per se raise the parents’ utility and second,
a higher number of children has a positive e¤ect on the level of PAYG-pension bene…ts
of the parents’ generation. In contrast to the former, the latter e¤ect is not taken
into account by parents when deciding on their number of o¤spring. Consequently,
the number of children they choose is too low and utility can be raised by introducing
a small subsidy per child that (partly) internalizes this external e¤ect. If, however,
the subsidy per child is relatively large as compared to the costs of raising a child,
then the e¤ective price of children is too low and the number of children exceeds the
optimal number so that utility may fall.
5.2 Merely reducing the PAYG-scheme
As was demonstrated in Section 4, when family size is a choice variable individuals
in general suboptimally decide on the number of o¤spring as children involve exter-
nalities. This emanates from the fact that the future contribution of a child to the
PAYG-scheme falls to society as a whole, and not exclusively to the individual par-
ent. This might incite one to conjecture that downsizing the PAYG-scheme leads to
a decrease in this external e¤ect, yielding a positive welfare e¤ect that enables the
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Pareto-improving transition from unfunded to funded pensions that is not possible
if fertility were exogenous. Yet, just like in the models of Verbon (1988) and Breyer
(1989) with exogenous fertility, merely reducing the PAYG-tax does not allow for a
Pareto-improvement. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Reducing the PAYG-tax in combination with a debt policy that com-
pensates the …rst generation of pensioners is not a Pareto-improvement.
Proof Suppose that at time t the PAYG-tax is cut by ¹ · ¿ . If N ot denotes the
number of old at that time, an increase in public debt of Not ¹nt¡1 is required to
completely compensate them, which must be redeemed by the current young and
future generations. If the government imposes on these generations a constant lump-
sum tax of z when young, the number of children chosen by these generations will






. Hence, the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is
satis…ed if z = ¹(1+r¡n)
1+r
. Assuming that the interest rate r exceeds the new constant
rate of population growth n, the current and all future generations of young gain
¹(1+r¡n)
1+r
from investing in a funded rather than an unfunded pension scheme. How-
ever, this gain is exactly o¤set by the lump-sum tax z. So lifetime income of the
current and future young generations is not a¤ected by the transition. Because prices
are not a¤ected either, this implies that the number of children as well as utility
remain unchanged, i.e., n = nt¡1. As the utility of the current generation of old is
not a¤ected by construction, it follows that no generation gains from the transition.
Hence, it cannot be a Pareto-improvement. ¥
This proposition generalizes the Verbon-Breyer result to a model with endogenous
fertility. The intuition behind this result is that a reduction in the size of the transfer
scheme in combination with a debt policy does not decrease the external e¤ect of
having children. It is true that the external e¤ect due to the existence of the PAYG-
scheme disappears if this scheme is abandoned as was conjectured above. But when
public debt is increased to compensate the loss incurred by the current generation
of pensioners, this introduces a new external e¤ect of equal size. What the policy
merely does is replacing the implicit debt of the PAYG-scheme by an explicit public
debt. This, however, does not alter the fact that an additional child enlarges the tax
base for this (implicit or explicit) debt.
5.3 Replacing pensions by child allowances
From Proposition 5 it follows that the ageing problem cannot be alleviated by a tran-
sition to a more funded scheme, unless at least one generation’s welfare decreases.
Obviously, in order to allow for a Pareto-improvement, the external e¤ect of chil-
dren should be internalized so that o¤spring increases. The following proposition
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shows that decreasing the PAYG-scheme and using the proceeds to …nance child al-
lowances, such that the cost of child rearing decreases, may indeed lead to a Pareto-
improvement. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Proposition 6 Reducing the PAYG-tax in combination with a debt policy that com-
pensates the …rst generation of pensioners can be Pareto-improving if it is accompanied
by the introduction of a child allowance scheme so that the total tax is not a¤ected.
The intuition behind this result is, as noted above, that the parents’ utility rises
both because they give birth to a larger number of children, which directly increases
their utility, and because they receive a higher PAYG-pension bene…t when they are
old. Depending on the speci…c parameter values, these utility gains can exceed the
loss from taxing current young and future generations in order to compensate the
initial retired for the decrease in their pension bene…t. In Appendix D we derive
an explicit condition for this to be true. Numerical simulation examples learn that
especially the rate of interest and the PAYG-tax are important for this condition
to hold, whereas the weight of children in the utility function (°) is not of great
signi…cance for this result. Figure 5 shows the maximal values of the child subsidy
for which, at a particular size of the PAYG-scheme, a Pareto-improvement is still
possible, in case the interest rate equals 2 and 5, respectively.20
20The parameter values underlying this …gure are ¯ = ° = " = 1, p = 0:1. Furthermore, a
Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed with a production elasticity of 0.5.
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Figure 5: Maximal Child Allowance for Pareto-Improvement.
As can be seen from the …gure, a high interest rate implies a smaller set of possible
Pareto-improving child allowances. Indeed, a high interest rate means a lower present
value of future gains, making a Pareto-improvement less likely. Furthermore, it may
even be that the pension bene…t ultimately increases if the number of children is
getting much higher than before the policy change. This happens when the initial
PAYG-scheme is relatively large.21
6 Conclusion
Both a smaller family size and increasing longevity imply serious challenges for mod-
ern western societies with extensive social security programmes in this new century.
How to best deal with these is a question that cannot be answered unambiguously, as
many studies have already pointed out. Still, most economists analyse the economic
consequences of population ageing without paying much attention to the underlying
21At an interest rate of 2, for instance, a child subsidy of 5% of the wage rate implies an eventual
decrease of the public pension bene…ts of almost 17% if the PAYG-tax is 10%, whereas the bene…t
increases by 2% if the tax equals 50%.
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causes. These stem to a large extent from the fact that in modern societies, fertility is
the endogenous source of population growth, i.e., family size is something people can
decide upon, besides savings and material consumption. Moreover, the existence of
PAYG-…nanced social security arrangements implies that the investment element is
completely socialized. Fertility choice is therefore only based on the direct utility that
a household gets from its progeny. Furthermore, factors that impact the household’s
(expected) lifetime income have consequences for the rate of population growth, and
subsequently for the social security arrangements that are …nanced on a PAYG-basis.
This paper does take the endogeneity of fertility into account. By considering
an economy where the investment aspect of a child is institutionalized via a public
PAYG-pension scheme, it is shown that this endogeneity causes the economy to be
seriously sensitive to shocks like upcoming pessimistic beliefs and increasing longevity
that in‡uence intertemporal decisions. Both tend to depress population growth and
thereby reduce the generosity of the social security system. These results are driven
by the fact that in an economy with social security, part of the bene…ts that progeny
brings about do not fall exclusively to the individual parent, but to all in society.
Apparently, children are to some extent a public good and consequently involve posi-
tive social externalities. Because individuals typically do not take these into account
when deciding on their family size, the rate of population growth may deviate from
its socially optimal value. We show, however, that the market outcome without gov-
ernment intervention is e¢cient. That is, the number of o¤spring is socially optimal
if the government does not redistribute between generations. On the other hand, in
a society with a PAYG-pension scheme, the number of o¤spring will be too low if
there is no child allowance. In that case, an appropriate child subsidy is required to
replicate the command optimum. So pensions and child allowances are like Siamese
twins: you should see neither of them or both together, but never one without the
other.
Of course, it is questionable whether the implementation of the optimal policy is
politically feasible, as it may harm some generations. In particular, in many societies
with an extensive PAYG-scheme the general feeling is that, in view of ageing, the
existing pension scheme is too generous, but downsizing the system is di¢cult because
this comes at the cost of lower utility for at least one generation. We have shown that
there may be a solution to this problem. If initially, as a consequence of the PAYG-
scheme, the number of children is too low, then it can be a Pareto-improvement
to replace part of the public pension scheme by a child-allowance scheme, thereby
assuring political feasibility. Our model thus proves the assertion that a Pareto-
improving cut in PAYG-pension bene…ts is impossible, to be no longer tenable, even
in the absence of endogenous growth and distortionary taxation. This suggests a
simple policy advise for countries that see their extensive PAYG-scheme endangered
by ageing: these countries should not only decrease the size of their pension schemes,
but at the same time introduce a child allowance scheme so as to broaden the tax
base for the remaining smaller PAYG-scheme.
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Appendix
A Appendix to Subsection 3.1
Linearizing …rst-order condition (7.b) with respect to ¸ gives the following relation
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s¤+´.
If p > ¿
1+r
, the felicity functions are strictly concave and (material) consumption
when young and children are weak complements (ucn & 0), then it holds that { > 0;
i.e., there is a positive relation between the marginal change in …rst-period material
consumption and the change in family size. Moreover, it also holds that jÁj < 1 and
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. Assuming that the exogenous rate of population growth (n) equals
n¤, that ucn = unc = 0 (additive separability), and emending …rst-period endowment
for the costs of raising the optimal number of children, i.e.,
(w)n endogenous ¡ (w)n exogenous = pn¤;
the level of material consumption, both when young and old, is equal in both cases.
Moreover, consumption when young initially declines to a greater extent and the
initial increase in savings is less if the number of children is exogenous. This can be
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seen as follows. In case of endogenous fertility the initial marginal change in savings
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In case of exogenous fertility the initial marginal change in savings is given by the
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B Appendix to Subsection 3.2
Taking the government budget constraint into account, comparative statics of the















where the matrix B = fbijg, i; j = 1; 2, with
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and the felicity functions are strictly concave and additively separable





C Appendix to Section 4
We extend the model presented in Section 2 by introducing a child allowance scheme:
a subsidy of ' < p per child is paid to the household which is …nanced by a lump-sum
tax µ: The households’ …rst-period budget constraint now looks like
cyt + (p¡ ')nt = w ¡ ¿ ¡ µt ¡ st: (C.1)
The households’ …rst-order conditions then become
cot+1 = (1 + r)¯c
y
t ; (C.2.a)
(p¡ ')nt = °cyt : (C.2.b)
From these equations we can derive the steady state for this model with PAYG-
pensions and child allowance,
cy¤ =
(p¡ ')(w ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)
(p¡ ')(1 + ¯ + °)¡ °¿
1+r
; n¤ =
°(w ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)
(p¡ ')(1 + ¯ + °)¡ °¿
1+r
: (C.3)
Bearing in mind that n' = µ, (C.3) can be written as
cy¤ =





1 + ¯ + ° ¡ °¿
p(1+r)
; n¤ =
°(w ¡ ¿) + µ(1 + ¯)
(1 + ¯ + °)p¡ °¿
1+r
: (C.4)
The steady-state command optimum can be derived from the equations in Section 4,
cy¤¤ =
w ¡ (1 + r)p
1 + ¯ + ° ¡ °
®
; n¤¤ = ®(1 + r): (C.5)
When we compare the conditions (C.2.a) and (C.2.b) to the …rst-order conditions for
the command optimum (16.a)-(16.c) we see that these coincide if
µ = µ¤¤ ´ pn¤¤ ¡ °cy¤¤; (C.6.a)
¿ = ¿ ¤¤ ´ w ¡ (1 + ¯ + °)cy¤¤: (C.6.b)
Moreover, it follows from equations (C.3), (C.5), (C.6.a) and (C.6.b) that the steady
state of the market economy coincides with the command optimum (i.e., µ = µ¤¤ = 0;
¿ = ¿¤¤ = 0) if ® = n
¤jµ=¿=0
1+r






> 0, from which it follows that @µ
¤¤
@®
> 0 and @¿
¤¤
@®
> 0. This proves Proposition
3.
27
D Appendix to Section 5
Suppose the economy is in a steady state characterized by ¿ = ¿ > 0 and ' = ' = 0
when we introduce a subsidy ' < p per child …nanced by the PAYG-social security
tax. If N ot denotes the number of old at that time, an increase in public debt of
Not nt¡1'nt is required to prevent their public pension bene…ts to decrease. This debt
must be redeemed by the current young and future generations. If the government
imposes on these generations a constant lump-sum tax of z when young, the number
of children chosen by these generations will be constant and equal to ~n. The present





. Hence, the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government is satis…ed if z = z0 ´ '~n(1+r¡~n)1+r .
The lifetime budget constraint of the current young and future generations reads
cot+1 = (1 + r) [w ¡ ¿ ¡ (p¡ ')nt ¡ cyt ¡ z] + nt(¿ ¡ 'nt+1): (D.1)
Because we consider a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, the new
steady state is reached after one period. Combining the …rst-order conditions (C.2.a)




b2 + 4a(1 + r)(w ¡ ¿ ¡ ~z)
2a
;
where a = °
2'
(p¡')2 and b = (1 + r)
³
1 + ¯ + ° ¡ °¿
(1+r)(p¡')
´
. Comparing utility levels
with and without the child bene…t scheme, it can be calculated that the level of z at
which future generations are equally well o¤ is
~z = w ¡ ¿ ¡ x(xa+ b)
1 + r
;






. A Pareto-improvement is possible if and
only if the tax that leaves the utility level of future generations unchanged exceeds
the additional tax that is necessary to redeem the initial government debt, that is, if
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